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Recently Senator McCarran, Democrat of Nevada, stated among other things
"If communism takes China completely, communism will take all Asia. If Japan
is denied access to the markets and food supplies of China, this nation will be
forced to give up its position in Japan, not for military reasons, but because we can
neither feed 85,000,000 Japanese nor provide a market for Japanese industrial
production. In that event the Japanese people will accept communism rather
than starve. And the next Communist advance will be into the Philippines. If
we continue to sit idly by while these events take place, we shall have forfeited our
world leadership for peace and democracy. All our gigantic efforts to rehabilitate
Western Europe as a bulwark against communism will have been largely to no
avail."1
This warning illustrates the importance of the area I am about to survey.
Although I served in the Pacific Military Intelligence Research Section, U. S.
Army, in 1945 and wrote "Japan's Financial authorities," published in the Bulletin
of the National Tax Association, volume XXXI, in March, 1946, and "Japan's Tax
Structure," published by the International Fiscal Association, Amsterdam, in
July, 1947, it does not make me an expert on the subject. Therefore I am using
such a cautious title. But I shall try to add a few facts to clarify the main problems
we are confronted with in Japan: 1. The geographic problem is how to make use
of the strategic advantages of Japan without increasing her military potential;
2. The political problem is how to stop communism without encouraging the
growth of authoritarianism in any form; 3. The economic problem is how to attain
economic and financial stability in the long run; 4. The main social problem is
the annual population increase of two million Japanese without any increase in
resources (land, capital, etc.) to take care of them resulting in a tremendous crime
wave, etc.; 5. The main military problem is how to provide Japan with self-defense
against both internal and external foes without nursing a viper, endangering S.
China and the Philippines.
All these major problems, of course, are interrelated and there are many minor
problems.
1. THE GEOGRAPHIC SITUATION
Japan is that long crescent-shaped group of four large islands (Kyushu,
Shikoku, Honshu, Hokkaido) and numerous small islands which lie off the Eastern
coast of Asia between 30 and 46 degrees north latitude, 130 and 146 degrees east
latitude. Somewhat south of the north temperate zone, it is an excellent location
for the development of human energies, intensive agriculture and hydroelectric
lNew York Times, April 17, 1949, p. 34.
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power. After World War II Japan lost Korea, Karafuto, Manchuria, etc. Now
the total land area is 145,000 square miles—about 33̂ 2 times that of Ohio. But
Japan's population of 85 million inhabitants is more than 12 times that of Ohio.
This overpopulation is a major source of troubles. In addition, about 85% of the
total area is mountainous (see figure 2). Many peaks, including the famous
Fuji, are volcanic and several are active. Volcanoes contributed to the formation
of deposits of sulphur and abrasives^ but also caused losses of life and property.
Volcanoes, earthquakes, typhoons, and frequent thunderstorms have exercised a
profound effect on the Japanese character. The people—nervously energetic,
often cruel, subjected to hysterical acts of violence, and possessed of a deeply
rooted admiration for the man who has the courage to take life, his own or
another's—have the profound sense of insecurity that comes from the fact that the
earth shakes under their feet and the mountains rain ashes and hot rocks. This
has helped to make them a very cohesive folk, leaning strongly upon one another,
more effective in group action than singly—hence more sensitive to group opinion
and receptive to authority. To the Japanese the personification of authority is the
Emperor (see figure 4), on whom they bestowed divine attributes in the hope or
belief that he could give them, his loyal and valuable subjects, some security against
unpredictable forces of nature that are themselves the ancient gods of the Japanese
and the ancestors of the royal house.
Probably Japan's greatest single natural resource is the position of the islands
between the principal Asiatic ports and those of North America, and the further
peculiarity of the conformation of those islands that places the best harbors on their
Pacific coast and gives that coast the most favorable soil and climate. Hence
this area already had a great concentration of population and a considerable
development of both commerce and industry long before the opening of the north
Pacific trade route brought the world's ships just offshore.
Japan dominates the sea lanes to northern Asia. The whole of the Sea of
Japan is truly a Japanese lake. The Sea of Okhotsk, immediately north of the Sea
of Japan and extending above the 68th parallel, likewise became a Japanese lake.
The radical curtailment of Japan's naval and air power did not nullify their
effectiveness as controls on world trade as long as she has a large industrial popula-
tion capable of supplying goods and services to the world market. Japan will tend
to dominate the commerce of the east coast of Asia.
Tokyo, Yokohama, Nagoya, Osaka, and Kobe, Japan's five principal port
cities, are on the far side of the main island and therefore much more accessible
to the world's shipping than would be any of the ports on the continent, and it is
easily seen that Japan is in a position to cut off or dominate most of our east coast
trade even though shorn of her naval and air power.
Strategically the Japanese islands can be considered as one land traversed by
two convenient channels for ship traffic, a narrow, very mountainous land bent
almost at right angles at 35 degrees north latitude near Tokyo Bay. Japan is a
land of good harbors. Her 17,000 miles of coast line are a continuing succession of
coves, bays, and estuaries. Thus the greater share of her domestic commerce can
be cheaply transported by water. There are a number of excellent deep-water
harbors on the Pacific side, particularly on the lower east-to-west extension of
Honshu. Yokohama and Tokyo on Tokyo Bay, Nagoya on Atsuta Bay, and
Kobe and Osaka on Osaka Bay become natural ports of call for all ships plying the
north Pacific shipping lanes (Fig. 1).
Then, too, Shikoku Island, the fourth in size, fits snugly in between Kyushu
and the southward-jutting Wakayama peninsula of Honshu. Between Shikoku
and the westerly extension of Honshu is the narrow island-studded Inland Sea
that begins at Osaka Bay and extends westward 300 miles to Shimonoseki Straits.
There are only three entrances to this all-important waterway and they all are
exceedingly narrow, treacherous, and easily defended.
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Japan's shipping and fishing industries developed in its protected waters in
primitive times. It was a safe avenue for the interisland commerce that must have
played an important part in unifying the nation before the beginning of written
history. After the establishment of transpacific commerce in the second half of
the last century it became even more important because it gave Japan a landlocked
passage from Kobe, her greatest shipping port, and Osaka, her greatest industrial
city, to the Yellow Sea and the Sea of Japan and the closest route to all the ports
of north China, Manchuria, and southern Korea.
FIG. 2. All suitable land is being utilized by the Japanese.
The amount and comparative certainty of the rainfall during the growing
season, together with the natural water storage in the heavy snow on the still
well-timbered mountains, makes possible an enormous production of rice in tiny
flooded fields (Fig. 2). Japan's food production has been almost sufficient for her
own needs, and until recently, it furnished a surplus for export, despite the fact that
only about 12 per cent of her total land area can be cultivated (Fig. 3).
Her situation gives Japan her exceedingly important fishing industry. The
seas all around her are exceptionally prolific in marine organisms. Offshore
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fishing was developed early to supply her population with proteins that could not
be raised on her restricted agricultural acreage. When Japan became industrialized
she already had a large number of experienced fishermen who readily adapted
themselves to the use of motorized equipment and began harvesting the entire
Pacific from the Arctic to the Antarctic as efficiently as a farmer harvests a field
of wheat. They not only kept Japan's rapidly growing industrial population
supplied with the seafood that is such an essential part of its diet but furnished
a large exportable surplus that has been an important factor in the country's
expanding foreign commerce.
It is important to emphasize that Japan's commercial potential has two obvious
factors: 1. production and 2. the utilization of the Asia-North America trade
routes. The removal of restrictions that hamper trade over these routes will
mean that their use will be vastly increased. The Japanese ports will never
FIG. 3. Intensive agriculture is the main occupation in Japan.
remain mere way stations on these routes as long as Japan has 85 million highly
productive inhabitants. That production must be reoriented to fit into a new
pattern of world trade based on amity and a free flow of goods rather than one of
uneconomic self-sufficiency, the accumulation of military supplies, and the capacity
to produce armaments is obvious.
2. THE POLITICAL SITUATION
The primitive basis of Japanese government is the family council. An early
unity of all local groups was achieved by the "King of kings," Mikado Jimmu
Tenno (550 B. C.) whose picture is very common (Fig. 4). The royal family
is in power so long that by the beginning of written history it was already reputed
to have had a divine origin. Political unity was the only advantage of the Japanese
in their long war to dispossess the larger, stronger Ainus. The political history of
Japan may be divided in six periods:
1. 555-1005—Japan under the rule of court nobles, naturalizing Chinese
culture.
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2. 1085-1550—The feudal period of Samurais and provincial nobles.
3. 1554-1624—The Christian interlude.
4. 1603-1868—The Tokugawa era of bureaucratic autocracy.
5. 1868-1945—The Meiji period and modernization of Japan. Copying of
alien civilization. Persistent, purposeful and ruthless expansion.
6. 1945- —Occupation period.
Throughout this history democracy never existed in Japan and it is difficult to
transplant it there now. General Mac Arthur and his staff are doing their best.
On March 31, 1949, was the 95th anniversary of our "Open Door" policy estab-
lished by Commodore Perry in 1854. It went by unnoticed. The Japanese greatly
admired Commodore Perry secretly (although he ruthlessly frustrated their designs)
but sometimes openly disparaged the sentimental collaborationists and appeasers
who conducted American affairs in Japan during subsequent periods. On April 14,
1949, Premier Shigeru Yoshida refused to commit himself before Parliament on
whether Japan would remain neutral in the event of a third world war. He did so
after a heated interchange with Communist deputy Sanzo Nozaka pressing for
"permanent neutrality."2 The present constitution outlaws wars, but seems
to be highly unrealistic in view of the ancient military tradition and present con-
ditions there. A firm and just administration of Japan by SCAP is absolutely
necessary.
Prof. Carl S. Shoup of Columbia University will arrive in Tokyo in late May or
June, 1949, for a four-month study3 to revise the Japanese internal revenue system.
3. THE SOCIAL SITUATION
The patriarchic social order of Japan was not changed by SCAP too much.
But a great amount of social legislation was passed in the last few years (Labor
Standards Act, Seamen's Law, Workmen's Compensation Insurance Law, Unem-
ployment Compensation Laws, Employment Security Law, etc.).
Shortly after the occupation of Japan by the U. S. Army, the Supreme Com-
mander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) announced that occupation policy would
encourage the growth of trade unions as one means of developing a peaceful and
democratic Japan. Confirmed by the Far Eastern Commission in December, 1946,
this policy was later included,in the Japanese constitution, and embodied in a
number of laws. The National Public Service Law gave all wage and salaried
workers employed by the Government the right to organize and engage in collective
bargaining, and a number of contracts were concluded between government workers
and the administrators of government departments and industries run by the
government. The law did not deny Government employees the right to strike,
but SCAP had full authority to forbid strikes which might endanger the objectives
of the occupation.
Nearly 40 per cent of organized Japanese labor is employed by the Government;
at the end of July, 1948, 2,500,000 out of Japan's 6,700,000 organized workers
were members of Government unions. In contrast with conditions in the United
States, about three-fourths of these Government employees were engaged in
industrial or other activities not usually considered as part of central Government
administration; nearly 850,000 were railroad workers, nearly 350,000 worked in
communications, more than 500,000 were in the educational system. In addition,
Government workers were employed in coal mines, in the merchant marine, and in
the tobacco, camphor and salt monopolies.
The spring and summer of 1948 were marked by a series of strikes over wage
disputes in the railroad and communications systems (radio, telephone and tele-
*Toledo Blade, April 15, 1949.
iNew York Times, April 17, 1949.
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graph) which aroused fears as to possible future interference with public services
essential to the Government and the occupation. At that time the union of
communications workers was Communist-dominated; there was Communist
influence in the railroad union but anti-Communists had gained control.
In July, after receiving a letter from SCAP, in regard to the trade-union
activities of public service employees, the Japanese Cabinet issued Order No. 201.
This Order outlawed acts of dispute by public service workers; revoked the right to
collective bargaining; abrogated existing collective bargaining agreements; and
FIG. 4. Mikado Jimmu Tenno, God-Emperor, center of all Japanese philosophy and life.
threatened with jail and fines anyone violating the terms of the ordinance. The
labor unions claimed that these restrictive measures violated the trade-union
principles laid down by the Far Eastern Commission; SCAP stated that these
principles did not apply to Government workers.
Under laws consequently enacted in December, 1948, all public service workers
were to be subject to the revised National Public Service Law until April 1, 1949,
except that provincial public workers, i.e., employees of prefectural and municipal
governments were to remain under the jurisdiction of Cabinet Order No. 201 until
other legislation is passed. However, on April 1, 1949, a new Public Corporations
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Labor Relations Law started to govern the labor relations of employees of the
public monopolies—tobacco, salt, crude camphor, and camphor oil—and of the
railroads. Communication workers are among the Government employees who
remain under the amended National Public Service Law. The revisions of the
National Public Service Law caused considerable unrest among Japanese labor
groups as well as considerable criticism in the United States. Differences of
opinion as to the new policy regarding government employees resulted in the
resignation of James Killen, the U. S. Labor Advisor to SCAP. Both the AFL
and the CIO conventions passed resolutions censuring the actions taken in Japan.4
Union membership in Japan increased slowly during 19.47 and 1948 compared
with the very rapid growth in earlier phases of the occupation. According to the
September "Summation" issued by SCAP, labor unions numbered 23,270 with a
membership of 5,724,851. The Japanese Labor Ministry reported 25,896 unions
with a membership of 5,926,986, and added the following figures for some major
industrial groupings:
Unions Members
Mining and manufacturing 12,792 2,702,144
Governmental and "free occupations" 5,187 1,013,479
Transportation 3,635 1,203,196
There are 4,273 collective agreements covering 8,585 unions with a membership
of 5,053,297.
Communism has made gains in Japan in the last year and a half in coal mining
and electrical workers' unions.5
Japan is highly overpopulated which causes social unrest. The comparison
between Japan and France on Chart 2 illustrates the gravity of the situation.
The overpopulation is also responsible for the present crime wave. The Legal
Affairs Committee on the Diet's House of Representatives reported on April 5,
1949, "Last year juvenile crimes amounted to roughly 250,000 out of a total of
520,000 recorded criminal offenses. On the basis of the 1948 informal census,
one boy or girl out of every 100 is a convicted delinquent. . . . These youths
should be given honest work to do and instead of building more.homes and asylums
we should build factories and workshops where these boys and girls can work."6
Such endeavor should be encouraged by SCAP. The Japanese need work,
land, and markets for the ever increasing population, if we are to prevent social
unrest. The best way to stop Communism is to make Democracy work.
4. THE ECONOMIC SITUATION
The Japanese economy consists of 50.3% agriculture and fishing, 19.7% mining
and manufacturing, 20.2% commerce, 7% public services and occupations, and
2.8% domestic work.7
Agriculture still is Japan's most important industry both in capital invested
and in net output. There is an enormous burden of taxation on farmers. They
are greatly in debt. Most of the subsidies granted favored industries are paid by
agriculture. There is a decline in soil fertility and increasing use of expensive
chemical fertilizers. The silkworm raising and charcoal burning are deteriorating.
Half of Japan's 16,000,000 arable acres are used for rice plantation. Second in
importance is barley. Other agricultural commodities raised by Japan are wheat,
rye, tobacco, tea, soybeans, fruits, pyrethrum, peppermint, camphor, and garden
vegetables.
The most important animal industries are sericulture, coast and deep-sea
fishing, and lifestock production.
*Labor Abroad, February, 1949, No. 10, p. 64.
5New York Times, April 10, 1949.
6New York Times, April 17, 1949, p. 32.
7Japan's Wirtchaft im Spiegel der Statistik, Dr. Georg Zimmermann, Berlin, 1941, p. 216.
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Japan mines coal, copper, gold, iron pyrites, petroleum, silver, zinc, sulphur,
lead, aluminum, manganese, and magnesium. It is important to us because Russia
cut off her supply of manganese to us in retaliation to the North Atlantic Pact.
Japanese commerce would need a merchant marine of 1 million tons to handle
the normal peacetime inter-island and coastal traffic, and 2 ^ million tons to
transport goods to and from the adjacent coast of Asia. This traffic is absolutely
vital to her industry. Japan would also need an internal air transportation
system to supplement the 15,000 miles of railroad tracks, canals, and motor trans-
portation. Because of World War II, Japan's foreign trade is way below the
pre-war average of 3.6% of the world's foreign commerce. Japan has to have
foreign markets in order to feed her growing population.
FIG. 5. The most modern textile machines in Japan.
With regard to Japanese manufacturing, the textile industry occupies first
place (Fig. 5). Output of textiles is valued at one-third of Japan's total output.
The heavy industries, largely the result of Japan's urge for industrial self-
sufficiency in the production of arms, is largely uneconomic. It had to be heavily
subsidized. Japan produces industrial machinery, engines and motors, prime
movers, marine engines, Diesel engines, electric motors and generators, machine
tools, railroad equipment, airplanes, automobiles and bicycles.8
The chemical industry is of increasing importance, especially the production of
synthetic petroleum, dyestuffs, cosmetics, drugs, glass, glassware, and rubber
goods. Chart No. 3 shows the organization of the methanol production in Japan.
The production of foodstuffs, clay products and wood products is steadily
increasing. Japan is self-sufficient in cement production. The production of
newspapers, periodicals and books is relatively more important in Japan than in
the U. S. The motion picture industry emphasizes traditional tales. Table I
indicates the trends in production from 1930 to 1948.
8Japan: Its Resources and Industries, Clayton D. Cams and C. L. McNichols, Harper &
Bros., 1944, pp. 231-232.
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Industries which increase the military potential of Japan should be curtailed.
Reconstruction of such industries, destroyed or damaged in World War II, may
again backfire. The key to the maintenance of Japan is production. The primary
responsibility for bringing about the required sharp increase in production must
of necessity rest with the people of Japan. No action by the United States of
itself could bring this about.
TABLE I































































































*Data for 1930-44 represent output of all utilities, while later data represent 95% of all
public utility generation.
SOURCE: "Japanese Economic Statistics," Bulletin No. 20, April, 1948, Research and
Statistics Division, SCAP-GHQ, Tokyo.
Economic cooperation of America is needed to accomplish two things:
1. Help in the rebuilding and development necessary to reknit the economic
fabric of Japan and to increase the level of production so that further relief will
not be needed.
2. Relief and financial aid to tide Japan over its present distress and allow
it time to accomplish the necessary expansion of production.
The destruction of Japan's industries is the most obvious of Japan's mis-
fortunes. Not all of the destruction was done by bombs; the worst damage was
done by the Japanese to themselves under the pressure of blockade. By 1944,
Japan was desperately short of three things it couldn't do without—oil, bauxite,
and iron ore. The worst case was oil, the shortage of ore was nearly as serious.
By 1944 the much publicized stockpiles of steel scrap (the Japanese had accumu-
lated about 250,000,000 tons by 1941)9 had been nearly exhausted. The govern-
ment launched a frenzied scrap drive. The greatest victim of the drive was the
cotton-textile industry. Of 13,000,000 spindles before the war, only about
2,800,000 were operable at Japan's surrender. Japan had 450 full-fashioned-
9"Japan's Road Back," Fortune, Vol. XXXIII, No. 3, March, 1946, p. 125.
1930-34
Average
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hosiery machines; all but 50 were broken up, though each machine cost about
$15,000 and yielded only 15 tons of scrap, worth about $250.10
5. THE FINANCIAL SITUATION
Money, at the end of the war, was plentiful. Notes outstanding of the Bank
of Japan increased from 5.9 billion Yen at the end of 1941 to 42.3 billion Yen at
the end of August, 1945, and were approaching 56 billion Yen at the end of 1945.
Prices were held stable in a white market by price fixing and rationing while bushels
of surplus money went shopping in the black market. By Bank of Japan estimate,
the black market price of rice in October, 1945, was 47 times the official price;
vegetable prices were nearly 10 times; sugar, sauce, and salt were 52 times.11
A huge excess of money and liquid claims over salable assets is commonplace
in the financial wreckage left by the war. Prodded by General MacArthur's
headquarters, the Japanese Government pared down some of the excess liquidity
with a walloping capital levy running up to 70%. In addition, a 100% tax was
applied to all war profits earned since Japan went to war.12
Another big financial operation accomplished for the Japanese economy was the
excision of the Zaibatsu, the handful of huge family trusts that owned or con-
trolled a good two-thirds of everything in Japan (Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo,
Yasuda, Iwasaki).
The Government was also ordered to stop all financial assistance to the cult
of State Shintoism, which every Japanese previously had to embrace in addition to
his personal religious beliefs. It also has to balance its annual budget.
Japan has lost as a result of the war 47% of her former territory while the
population, within the reduced area, has witnessed an increase of 13 million since
the surrender. Industrial production has declined 77%. Even in total pro-
duction, there has occurred a decrease of 40%.13 It is impossible, under such
circumstances, to stabilize the Japanese economy without the aid of foreign capital.
In spite of the strenuous effort for economic recovery, industrial production lags
behind expectation because of uncertainties of the future, instable exchange
rates ($1 = 14-320 yen), lack of capital and the unknown burden of reparations.
The Board of Directors of the Export-Import Bank of Japan on April 21, 1948,
authorized participation to the extent of 29 million dollars by the Bank with a
group of commercial banks in a $60 million revolving credit in favor of the Occupied
Japan Export-Import Revolving Fund to finance purchase and exportation to
Japan of U. S. cotton, including cotton linters and waste. This Fund was estab-
lished by SCAP for the purpose of providing a credit base and a means for
financing primarily on a self-liquidating basis, Japanese imports and exports of
commodities and services required for the achievement of the objectives and
policies of our Occupation. Accordingly, SCAP transferred to the Fund approxi-
mately $104,000,000 worth of gold, silver valued at $18,000,000, and cash $378,000.
Thereby we are subsidizing Japan's foreign trade. This help, though great, is not
adequate to achieve financial stability and to sustain 85,000,000 Japanese in their
poorly-endowed islands.
6. THE MILITARY SITUATION
On August 14, 1945, General MacArthur was designated Supreme Commander
by the nine nations at war with Japan (Australia, Canada, China, France, Nether-
lands, New Zealand, U. S. S. R., U. K., and U. S.) and accepted the unconditional
surrender of Japan. Occupation forces which first went ashore were U. S. troops
"Ibid.
""Japan's Road Back," Fortune, Vol. XXXIII, No. 3, March, 1946, p. 128.
12"The U. S. Does a Job," Fortune, Vol. XXXV, No. 3, March, 1947, p. 134.
13"The Birth of the New Japan," Education, Nov., 1948, p. 171.
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and the policy directives under which General MacArthur began enforcing Japanese
fulfillment of the surrender terms were issued by the U. S. Government on August
29, 1945. The policy document was the product of a coordination of efforts among
the State, War, and Navy Departments recognizing that in the postwar period
U. S. foreign policy and U. S. military policy must function as one, as national
policy.
In Tokyo, SCAP works closely with the Allied Council for Japan (ACJ) which
is composed of SCAP or his deputy as chairman and U. S. member, one representa-
tive from the Soviet Union, one from China, and one representing jointly Great
Britain, Australia, New Zealand and India. To carry out the job of occupation,
SCAP has a carefully planned and specially staffed organization composed of staff
sections controlling virtually every phase of life in Japan. SCAP closed 159
institutions with assets of 209 billion yen. Liquidation proceeds have been 8.8
billion yen and payments of domestic claims 7.4 billion yen.14 SCAP is demili-
tarizing Japan. The Japanese people seem united in opposing war. Their
determination is based not only on the formal pledge to renounce the right to
belligerancy as set forth in the new constitution, but on their hatred and dis-
illusionment with regard to the past militarism.
Strong opposition is being voiced by China and the Philippines to the U. S.
plan to assist and promote Japan's recovery. It is based on the apprehension that
an economically strong Japan would again prove to be a menace to them. But
General MacArthur never envisaged any plan for American assistance to Japan
at the expense of China or other Asiatic countries. The recent change in American
policy toward Japan in assisting her recovery has given new hope to the Japanese
people. But real recovery for Japan waits upon the formulation of a comprehensive
and coordinated program for the revival of all Far Eastern countries along the lines
which the United States has been pursuing in Europe, i.e., a PACIFIC SECURITY
PACT, tieing together all countries opposed to aggression from Alaska to New
Zealand.
""Two Years of Occupation," SCAP HGQ, August, 1947, p. 10.
